Agency Law in Cyberspace by DeMott, Deborah A.
      Agency Law in Cyberspace 
 
             By 
 
          Deborah A. DeMott* 
 
 Recent cases from the United States illustrate the broad-ranging applicability of 
common-law agency doctrines to legal relationships that stem from interactions occurring in 
cyberspace. Despite the internet’s novelty, it is not surprising that it furnishes the context for 
questions to which common-law agency proves responsive. Agency law provides a general 
vocabulary of concepts and doctrines applicable to the wide range of situations in which one 
person’s conduct carries consequences for the legal position of another person when the actor 
acted as the other person’s representative.   
 Agency doctrine accomplishes three basic tasks. First, it defines the circumstances under 
which a relationship is characterized as one of agency as opposed to some other legal 
characterization, such as a debtor-creditor relationship. As will soon be evident, applying this 
definition requires specifying whether someone or something has legal capacity to be a principal 
or an agent in an agency relationship. Second, agency identifies the bases under which legal 
consequences stemming from one person’s conduct are attributed to another person. The relevant 
consequences may include the creation of rights and obligations stemming from a transaction, 
the imputation of the agent’s knowledge to the principal, and the imposition of vicarious liability 
on the principal as a consequence of tortious conduct by the agent. Third, agency determines 
rights and duties as between principal and agent themselves, complementing and supplementing 
any contract between them. Although the specifics of agency doctrine vary somewhat among 
common-law jurisdictions, in each the basic doctrines are similar, arguably more so than for 
other subjects within the general law.   
                                                          
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
 1
 Consider first how common-law agency defines the relationships from which these 
consequences follow and how this definition may apply to interactions via the internet. As 
defined in the American Law Institute’s new Restatement (Third) of Agency, agency is “the 
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another 
person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests consent or otherwise consents so to act.”1 The issues in Batzel v. 
Smith – ranging well beyond agency questions – stemmed from an e-mail message posted to a 
listserv asserting that the plaintiff possessed paintings looted during World War II, that she had 
inherited the paintings, and that she claimed to be descended from Heinrich Himmler.2 The 
plaintiff, who denied that the assertions were true, sued the individual who sent the e-mail  
message; the operator of the website, who chose to post it following some editing; and the 
website’s commercial sponsor. A majority of the court held that the website operator’s liability 
was governed by the federal statute setting limits on liability under state law for defamatory 
postings on the Internet and other computer networks.3 If the website operator reasonably 
understood the message to have been sent for internet publication, the statute shielded the 
operator from liability because the website operator, by selecting and editing the message, did 
not engage in “creation or development of information” contained in the message. On the other 
hand, if the operator should reasonably have concluded that the message was not intended for 
publication (it arrived via a different e-mail address) the statute would not shield the operator 
from liability. 
 The agency issue in Batzel was less controversial. All members of the court agreed that 
the website’s commercial sponsor was not subject to vicarious liability for the website operator’s 
actions. Although the sponsor furnished $8,000 in financial support to the website operator, the 
relationship between them did not satisfy the requisites of a principal-agent relationship. To 
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establish an agency relationship would require showing that the sponsor had the right or ability 
to control the website operator’s activities, but the sponsorship agreement gave the sponsor no 
right to control what the website operator published and disclaimed any right of control on the 
part of the sponsor.  
Thus, in cyberspace as elsewhere, an agency relationship requires that an actor assent to 
act subject to the control of another party. Moreover, the fact that the website’s sponsor may 
have anticipated benefit through the sponsorship relationship did not transform its relationship 
with the website operator into an agency relationship. After all, few parties–including 
commercial sponsors of all sorts of communications activity–enter into a contract without 
anticipating some prospective benefit. But that anticipation does not transform the relationship 
into an agency relationship, a characterization that follows only when the parties assent that one 
shall act on behalf of the other and subject to the other’s control.   
 To apply the definition of an agency relationship may require determining whether a 
given someone or something has capacity to function as either an agent or a principal for 
purposes of common-law agency. A person, whether or not an individual, has capacity to act as a 
principal if, at the time the agent takes action, the person would have had capacity if acting in 
person.4 In contrast, any person may ordinarily be empowered to act as an agent.5 Thus, a minor 
may not be bound by a contract entered into on the minor’s behalf by an adult principal; agency 
law looks through the agent to the principal to assess the principal’s capacity. However, 
assuming a minimum of physical and mental ability, a minor may act as an agent, even to bind a 
principal when the minor would lack capacity to bind him or herself to the same transaction.  
 But acting as either an agent or a principal requires that the actor be a “person,” 
terminology that clearly embraces–in addition to individuals–corporations and other legally-
recognized associations as well as governments and their subdivisions if able to possess legal 
rights and incur obligations. To be sure, in some areas of law, legal personality is not defined so 
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stingily; maritime usage, which ascribes gender to ships, also speaks of “ships’ agents” and 
subjects ships themselves to liability in some instances. Nonetheless, for purposes of common-
law agency, a ship is a fictitious legal instrumentality. It does not control “its” lawyer who 
defends it in litigation nor does it otherwise appoint “its” own agents. 
 Against this background, consider the import of the commonly-used term “electronic 
agent,” in particular as applied to a computer program that, once launched, enters into 
transactions within constraints identified in its program. From the standpoint of common-law 
agency, a computer program is not capable of acting as a principal or an agent because it is not a 
person that may itself hold legal rights and be subject to obligations. Common-law agency views 
an “electronic agent” as the instrumentality of the person who uses it, comparable to any other 
physical object used in connection with interactions with third parties, such as a typewriter, a 
calculator, or a fax machine. As a consequence, if a computer program malfunctions, even in 
ways its designer or user did not anticipate, the agency-law consequences for the user are no 
different from those stemming from malfunctions by other instrumentalities. A malfunctioning 
“electronic agent” is not analogous to an employee who, while indulging in a “frolic” of the 
employee’s own, commits a tort for which the employer is not subject to vicarious liability 
because the employee acted outside the scope of employment.  
 Happily, legislation concerning electronic agents is consistent with common-law agency 
on this point. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) defines an “electronic agent” as 
a “computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an 
action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without review or 
action by an individual.”6 To the same effect is the federal Electronic Signature in Global and 
National Commerce Act.7 Under both statutes, “person” is a defined term that does not 
encompass an “electronic agent.” The official commentary to UETA explicitly characterizes an 
“electronic agent” as a “machine” that is the tool of the person that uses it, despite its ability to 
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initiate or respond–within the limits of its programming– without further intervention by that 
person.  
 Moreover, conducting a transaction in cyberspace does not appear to vary the bases on 
which a principal may be bound by actions taken by an agent. This is so even when the agent 
proves to be highly unreliable. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Recovery Express, Inc., the 
plaintiff’s business included selling out-of-service railcars and parts.8 The plaintiff received an e-
mail stating an interest in buying rail cars as scrap from an individual who identified himself in 
the e-mail as “‘albert arillotta from interstate demolition and recovery express....’” Following 
subsequent phone calls, the plaintiff forwarded sales order forms confirming terms of the sale to 
Interstate. The railcars were delivered to Mr. Arillotta at the plaintiff’s own railyard, where Mr. 
Arillotta disassembled and transported them away. Mr. Arillotta’s check in payment of 
$115,757.36 in invoices sent to Interstate Demolition bounced. Interstate Demolition itself, 
allegedly as a consequence of fraudulent conduct by Mr. Arillotta, no longer existed by the time 
of the suit. Thus the plaintiff’s suit against Recovery Express, with which Mr. Arillotta (and 
Interstate) shared office space.  
The plaintiff’s sole hope of recovery against Recovery Express turned on agency 
doctrines. This is because the plaintiff was unable to show that Recovery benefitted either from 
the disassembled railcars themselves or from money generated by their sale. As a consequence, 
the plaintiff’s claim against Recovery Express turned on attributing Mr. Arillotta’s conduct to 
Recovery Express. The court, granting Recovery Express’s motion for summary judgment, 
analyzed the facts of its dealings with Mr. Arillotta through the framework provided by 
common-law agency. Although the specific application of this framework presented a question 
of first impression, two familiar agency doctrines did the work.  
First, did Mr. Arillotta act with actual authority to bind Recovery? As defined in the 
Restatement, an agent acts with actual authority “when, at the time of taking action, the agent 
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reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the 
principal wishes the agent so to act.”9 The plaintiff, however, came forward with no evidence to 
raise a genuine issue about whether Mr. Arillotta reasonably believed he acted with actual 
authority from Recovery Express. This is unsurprising as Mr. Arilotta held no formal position 
with Recovery Express. Second, did Mr. Arillotta act with apparent authority? As defined in the 
Restatement, “apparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a 
principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has 
authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s 
manifestations.”10 Apparent authority thus turns on the reasonableness of a third party’s belief 
that the agent acts with actual authority and on whether that belief is traceable to a manifestation 
of the principal.       
 What’s interesting and novel about the fact pattern in CSX Transportation is the basis for 
the plaintiff’s apparent authority claim. Although Mr. Arillotta held no formal position with 
Recovery Express, it assigned him an e-mail address (albert@recoveryexpress.com) with its 
domain name. Mr. Arillotta’s other connections to Recovery Express – shared office space, 
phone and fax numbers, mailing address – may not have been evident to the plaintiff prior to 
making the sales contract and, in any event, emerged solely from representations made by Mr. 
Arillotta himself, not Recovery. In contrast, by assigning Mr. Arillotta an e-mail address with its 
domain name,  Recovery Express itself engaged in conduct conveying some meaning about its 
association with Mr. Arillotta. As it happens, the e-mail assignment occurred because officers of 
Recovery had an interest in Interstate Demolition, leading Recovery Express to allow Mr. 
Arillotta’s use of its premises and facilities, including e-mail services. Neither Recovery Express 
nor its officers shared other property of Recovery Express with Interstate Demolition or Mr. 
Arillotta. 
                                                          
9 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01. 
10 Id. § 2.03. 
 6
 The question for the court was whether, by assigning Mr. Arillotta an e-mail address 
containing its domain name, Recovery Express made a manifestation on which a third party like 
the plaintiff might reasonably rely in concluding that Mr. Arillotta acted with actual authority to 
bind  Recovery Express to purchase a sizable quantity of railroad cars. The answer is no. 
Concluded the court, “Granting an e-mail domain name, by itself, does not cloak the recipient 
with carte blanche authority to act on behalf of the [grantor]. Were this so, every subordinate 
employee with a company e-mail address–down to the night watchman–could bind a company to 
the same contracts as the president.”11  
That is, although a company’s act of assigning an e-mail domain name constitutes a 
manifestation of some association between the company and the assignee of the address, it 
conveys insufficient information about the nature of the association to furnish a basis on which a 
third party might reasonably believe the assignee has actual authority to commit the company to 
a particular transaction. Moreover, the court identified useful analogies in “low-tech situations” 
in which a principal has made a nonspecific manifestation of some association with an agent. 
Employees or other agents given business cards or stationery with a company’s name or logo do 
not possess indicia of apparent authority to bind the company to a transaction. Unlike a title, 
such indicia do not indicate the type or nature of actions that the person who possesses them has 
authority to take on the company’s behalf. 
 Despite its cyberspace ingredient, CSX Transportation is a good illustration of a 
recurring  pattern in cases involving apparent authority: a careless principal and a credulous third 
party, linked by a devious agent. As CSX Transportation illustrates, apparent authority protects 
only third parties who reasonably believe an agent to be authorized; the belief, moreover, must 
be somehow traceable to a manifestation of the principal, not the agent, however persuasive the 
agent may be.  
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 Apparent authority doctrine also responds to another recurring pattern, not evident in 
CSX Transportation: an agent who acted with actual authority not provable by the third party, 
when the agent is allied with a principal who, regretting the outcome of the agent’s actions, 
opportunistically denies that the agent acted with authority. That is, the large number of cases in 
which a principal’s liability is based on apparent authority may well include some number of 
instances in which the agent acted consistently with a reasonable understanding of the principal’s 
manifestations about what the principal wished the agent to do but, after the consequences 
become evident, the principal denies that the agent acted with actual authority and the third party 
cannot or does not surmount the hurdles of proving otherwise.  
 The same insight should be applicable to dealings conducted in cyberspace or otherwise 
through novel means. An older case from the United States subjects a principal to liability on the 
basis of inferences reasonably to be drawn by third parties from the position in which the 
principal evidently placed its agent, although the principal’s particular business was novel. In 
Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., a company that produced musical recordings engaged singers to 
perform live “tone test” recitals to demonstrate the recordings’ accuracy.12 The company’s agent, 
unbeknownst to the singers, was authorized only to engage them on payment terms that 
conditioned payment to the singers on revenues generated by each recital. The agent engaged the 
singers on unconditional terms, standard practice in the music industry when singers were 
engaged to perform recitals. The court held that the novel use of recitals made by the company–a 
real-time comparison of live with then-new recorded sound–furnished no basis on which a singer 
should believe the company’s agent had authority only to commit to payment on conditional 
terms “unheard of” in connection with musical recitals otherwise.13 Just as CSX Transportation 
illustrates the limits of apparent authority when invoked by a credulous third party, Kidd 
illustrates how robustly the doctrine may operate when a third party’s belief in an agent’s 
authority is reasonable and is based on the position in which principal has placed its agent, 
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despite the novelty of the specific business proposition tying the principal and its agents to third 
parties.            
 One measure of the health of any body of legal doctrine is its capacity to generate 
outcomes that are acceptable–on grounds of moral intuition, economic efficiency, or otherwise–
in the face of changes in underlying factual circumstances. Not all doctrines within common-law 
agency met this test. For example, the common law posited that a principal’s loss of capacity 
automatically revoked all prior grants of actual authority. Individuals were thereby denied the 
ability, prior to the onset of incapacity, to establish an agency relationship through which legally 
effective action may be taken on the principal’s behalf in accordance with the principal’s 
instructions. Unsurprisingly, statutes in all U.S. jurisdictions now permit the creation of 
“durable” actual authority through a written instrument that so provides when executed by a 
then-competent principal. In contrast, agency-law doctrines applicable to interactions in 
cyberspace have proven more robust. The definition of an agency relationship, the specification 
of legal personality for agency-law purposes, and the bases on which the legal consequences of 
an agent’s conduct may be attributed to the principal all translate well into the new medium.  
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